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ORIGINALIST THEORY AND PRECEDENT: 
A PUBLIC MEANING APPROACH1 
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF 
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.2 Cambridge University 
Press. 2017. PP. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper). 
Lawrence B. Solum3 
INTRODUCTION: ORIGINALISM AND PRECEDENT, 
AGAIN? 
Much ink has already been spilled on the relationship of 
constitutional originalism to precedent (or, more specifically, the 
doctrine of stare decisis).4 The debate includes contributions from 
 
 1. Copyright 2018 by the author. Permission is hereby granted to make copies 
including copies in electronic form for educational or scholarly purposes. 
 2. Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. 
 3. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 4. The theoretical position that is outlined in this Part provides the gist of ideas 
contained in several articles. See Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: 
Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269 (2017); 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as 
Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative 
Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Lawrence 
B. Solum, What Is Originalism?, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: ESSAYS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
409, 440 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009). In addition to the published and forthcoming articles, works in 
progress include Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis (Aug. 20, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint 
Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice (Apr. 11, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215. 
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Randy Barnett,5 Steven Calabresi,6 Kurt Lash,7 Gary Lawson,8 
John McGinnis with Michael Rappaport,9 Michael Paulsen,10 and 
Lee Strang,11 not to mention Justice Antonin Scalia12—all 
representing originalism in some form. Living constitutionalism 
has also been represented both implicitly and explicitly, with 
important contributions from Phillip Bobbitt,13 Ronald 
Dworkin,14 Michael Gerhardt,15 Randy Kozel,16 and David 
Strauss.17 Some writers are more difficult to classify; Akhil Amar 
comes to mind.18 And there are many other contributions to the 
debate.19 Opinions range from the view that precedent should 
 
 5. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as 
It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005). 
 6. Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, 
and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 637 (2006). 
 7. Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. 
L. REV. 1437, 1480–81 (2007). 
 8. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 23 (1994); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent 
Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 1 (2007). For critiques of Lawson, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, On Lawson on Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (1994); Charles Fried, 
Reply to Lawson, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35 (1994); Frederick Schauer, Precedent 
and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45 
(1994). 
 9. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 169 (2013). 
 10. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of 
Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731–34 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating 
Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 
109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1537 n.1 (2000). 
 11. Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of 
Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729. 
 12. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 138–40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 13. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991). 
 14. The most important text in Dworkin’s extensive body of work is RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE 
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). 
 15. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006). 
 16. RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017); 
Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 105, 105 
(2015). 
 17. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 18. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 26, 78–89 (2000). 
 19. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1011 (2003); John Tuskey, Do as We Say and Not (Necessarily) as We Do: The Constitution, 
Federalism, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise of Judicial Power, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 153, 
180–81 (2005). 
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invariably prevail over the original public meaning of the 
constitutional text to the polar opposite view, that precedent must 
give way to original meaning in almost every case.20 
Here is the roadmap. Part I provides a brief introduction to 
contemporary originalism. Part II describes the problem of 
precedent for originalism, emphasizing that the nature of the 
problem depends in part on our understanding of precedent. Part 
III offers some reflections on the question as to the constitutional 
status of the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis in the United 
States Supreme Court. 
I. A VERY BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC 
MEANING ORIGINALISM 
“Public Meaning Originalism” (PMO) is the version of 
originalist constitutional theory that holds that the content 
communicated by the constitutional text to the public at the time 
each provision was framed and ratified is binding on 
constitutional actors. Like almost all the other members of the 
originalist family of constitutional theories,21 PMO includes two 
core ideas: (1) the Fixation Thesis (the meaning of each 
constitutional provision is fixed at the time the provision was 
framed and ratified), and (2) the Constraint Principle 
(constitutional practice should, at a minimum, be consistent with 
the original meaning of the constitutional text).22 
PMO goes beyond the core by arguing that the best 
understanding of “original meaning” is the public meaning of the 
constitutional text at the time each provision was framed and 
ratified: this is the Public Meaning Thesis.23 The public meaning 
of the constitutional text is the communicative content, 
understood as the content communicated to the public by the text 
and the publicly available context of constitutional 
communication. Thus, the original meaning is a function of both 
(1) semantics and (2) contextual enrichment. The semantic 
 
 20. The range of opinions is surveyed in infra Part II.B. 
 21. Original law originalism may be an exception. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism 
Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 161 (2017) (arguing that the Fixation Thesis would not 
play a role in a possible world in which there was not constitutional text but not taking a 
position on the role the text played in the original law). 
 22. Phrases like “Public Meaning Originalism,” “Fixation Thesis” and “Constraint 
Principle” are capitalized to indicate that they are proper names for the specific views as 
defined. 
 23. See Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis, supra note 4. 
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meaning of the constitutional text is produced by the conventional 
semantic meanings of the words and phrases as combined by 
syntax (roughly, grammar and punctuation): this is sometimes 
called the “literal meaning” of the text. But “literal meaning” is 
not the same as the original public meaning of the text. For one 
thing, semantic ambiguities are usually resolved by context. For 
another, the full communicative content of the text includes what 
philosophers of language and linguistic theorists call 
“pragmatics”: I will use the phrase “contextual enrichment”24 to 
refer to the content generated by implicatures, implicitures, 
presuppositions, modulations, and free enrichments.25 Thus, the 
full communicative content communicated to the public by the 
constitutional text is contextually disambiguated and enriched 
semantic content. 
Other members of the originalist family differ from PMO in 
their account of the nature of original meaning. For example, the 
most sophisticated contemporary version of intentionalism holds 
that the meaning of the constitutional text is determined by the 
communicative intentions of the authors.26 Similarly, original 
methods originalism holds that the meaning of the text is the 
meaning that the text would have been given at the time of 
framing and ratification if the original methods of constitutional 
interpretation had been applied.27 Original law originalism is 
different: it holds that the original law (and not the meaning of the 
text) continues to be binding, unless it is properly changed by 
procedures authorized by the original law itself.28 
Many originalists also affirm the interpretation-construction 
distinction.29 For the purposes of this Article, “interpretation” is 
 
 24. In the philosophy of language, the preferred phrase is “pragmatic enrichment.” 
François Recanati, Pragmatic Enrichment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 67 (Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara eds., 2012). 
 25. See Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 4; Solum, Triangulating Public 
Meaning, supra note 4. 
 26. See Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). A different approach that 
does not specify a conception of “intention” is found in the work of Richard Kay. See, e.g., 
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). 
 27. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 9. 
 28. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015); 
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
817 (2015). 
 29. See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 4. 
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stipulated to be the activity that discovers the meaning (more 
precisely, communicative content30) of the constitutional text. 
“Construction” is stipulated to be the activity that determines the 
legal effect to be given that meaning. Legal effects include the 
decision of cases by courts, constitutional actions by officials and 
institutions and the announcement of legal norms in the form of 
constitutional doctrines—usually, but not always, contained in 
judicial opinions. Although this distinction might be described 
using a different vocabulary, the underlying conceptual 
distinction is fundamental and should be accepted by all 
constitutional theorists. The meaning of a text is one kind of thing; 
its application is a different kind of thing—no one should dispute 
this distinction. This distinction has a long history in American 
legal theory, beginning with Francis Lieber and crystallizing in the 
work of the great contracts scholar, Arthur Corbin.31 
The interpretation-construction distinction interacts with the 
degree of constitutional underdeterminacy.32 For almost all 
originalists, if the constitutional text is determinate with respect 
to a particular issue or case, all of the important work is done at 
the interpretation stage (setting aside the role of precedent). Once 
we know the determinate meaning of the text, then the proper 
construction follows. But if the text is underdeterminate, allowing 
more than one possible outcome in a constitutional case, then 
constitutional construction will be required. 
 
 30. The communicative content of the constitutional text is best conceptualized as 
the set of concepts and propositions conveyed by the text—in the philosophical sense of 
“propositions” and “concepts.” See Matthew McGrath & Devin Frank, Propositions, in 
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions/. 
 31. See generally Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 1: Francis Lieber, NEW 
PRIV. L. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19/interpretation-and-
construction-1-francis-lieber-greg-klass/; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 2: 
Samuel Williston, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 23, 2015), 
https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/23/interpretation-and-construction-2-samuel-
williston-greg-klass/; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 3: Arthur Linton Corbin, 
NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 25, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/25/interpretation-
and-construction-3-arthur-linton-corbin-greg-klass/; see also Ralf Poscher, The 
Hermeneutical Character of Legal Construction, in LAW’S HERMENEUTICS: OTHER 
INVESTIGATIONS (Simone Glanert & Fabien Girard eds., 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2696486. 
 32. On the role of determinacy in originalist theory, see Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive 
Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459 (2016); see also Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy 
Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
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We can use the phrase “construction zone”33 to refer to the 
set of issues with respect to which the original meaning of the 
constitutional text is underdeterminate. Similarly, the phrase 
“interpretation zone”34 can be used to designate the case where 
the crucial work is done by the communicative content of the 
constitutional text. The version of PMO developed in my work 
affirms the interpretation-construction distinction and assumes 
moderate constitutional underdeterminacy. 
An originalist methodology describes the practices by which 
the original meaning of the constitutional text can be discovered. 
Ideally, an originalist methodology will provide a set of best 
practices that yield results that can be replicated and verified. In 
Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, 
and the Constitutional Record,35 I have suggested that original 
public meaning can best be determined using a combination of 
three techniques: (1) the method of corpus linguistics, (2) the 
method of studying the constitutional record, and (3) the method 
of originalist immersion. Each of these three methods provides a 
check on the others, allowing for the triangulation of public 
meaning. 
The debate about the proper relationship between 
originalism and precedent can be understood in two distinct ways: 
first, as a debate internal to originalist constitutional theory, and 
second, as an external critique of originalism. The internal debate 
is complicated by the theoretical differences among originalists. 
Likewise, the external critique is complexified by the many 
different versions of nonoriginalist constitutional theory. Of 
necessity, this Review simplifies, focusing on PMO as the 
representative form of originalism and relying on a generic form 
of nonoriginalist living constitutionalism to stand in for many 
distinct views. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRECEDENT FOR ORIGINALIST 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
With a brief introduction to PMO on the table, I now turn to 
a statement of the problem of precedent and originalism. 
 
 33. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 572 
(2010). 
 34. Samuel P. Jordan & Christopher K. Bader, State Power to Define Jurisdiction, 47 
GA. L. REV. 1161, 1213 (2013) (using the phrase “interpretation zone”). 
 35. See Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 4. 
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A. WHY IS PRECEDENT A PROBLEM FOR ORIGINALISM? 
Precedent is clearly a component of constitutional litigation 
as currently practiced. The opinions of the Justices and the briefs 
filed by parties are filled with citations to cases. But originalism 
seems (on the surface) to suggest that this is a mistake. If the 
public meaning of the constitutional text requires a certain 
outcome, then the Constraint Principle suggests that the citation 
of precedent is superfluous and adherence to authority that is 
contrary to original meaning is wrong. PMO seems to imply that 
current practice of precedent in constitutional cases is mistaken: a 
radical change is required. Some versions of living 
constitutionalism avoid this problem entirely; for example, 
common law constitutionalism relies on constraint by precedent 
as the primary alternative to constraint by the constitutional text. 
Why is this implication of PMO a problem? One problem is 
very practical: the doctrine of stare decisis is pervasive, and it may 
be difficult to get judges and Justices to adhere to original 
meaning when it is inconsistent with precedent. But suppose that 
it is practically possible to comply with original meaning and 
overrule all the precedents that would stand in the way. There 
would still be a question as to whether it would be normatively 
desirable to do so. As we will see below, there is a range of views 
about the proper normative alignment of precedent and original 
meaning.36 The normative arguments favoring precedent over 
originalism are too numerous and complex to enumerate here. 
One especially difficult problem would occur during the transition 
to originalism: compliance with original meaning may require a 
wholesale revision in constitutional doctrine on a variety of topics 
and hence could introduce instability into the law. Another 
problem would arise if the precedents are normatively more 
attractive than the original meaning. The discussion that follows 
focuses on these “normative problems of precedent” for 
originalism. 
B. THE RANGE OF VIEWS 
Now consider the range of views about the proper 
relationship between precedent and original meaning. Some 
living constitutionalists take the position that precedent should 
always (or almost always) displace original meaning; we might call 
 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
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this the “living constitutionalist hard line.” David Strauss 
represents this view;37 his version of common law 
constitutionalism makes precedent the alpha and omega of 
constitutional analysis. The hard line can be contrasted to what 
we call a “living constitutionalist soft line,” which would allow the 
original meaning of the constitutional text to prevail over 
precedent in at least some cases. Constitutional pluralism allows 
for this possibility: if both precedent and text are methods or 
modalities of constitutional interpretation and construction, then 
there may be cases in which precedent must give way to the 
original meaning. 
Some originalists, especially Gary Lawson38 and Michael 
Paulsen,39 advocate an “originalist hard line,” taking the position 
that the original meaning must always (or almost always) prevail 
over precedent: because they believe that the constitution itself 
provides default rules that resolve what would otherwise be cases 
of underdetermination, their view (taken to its logical extreme) 
would seem to imply that precedent should play no role in 
constitutional adjudication. Other originalists are softliners. 
Famously, Justice Scalia, wrote, “stare decisis is not part of my 
originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.”40 Randy 
Barnett allows for precedent to play a role in the construction 
zone.41 Lee Strang would allow for a stare decisis effect for 
originalist precedent.42 
C. THEORIES OF STARE DECISIS 
There is a large and complex literature on the theory of 
precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis,43 including Randy 
Kozel’s important book, Settled Versus Right. The word 
“precedent” can refer to many things, but I will be discussing 
judicial precedent in the form of the doctrine of stare decisis for 
the remainder of this Article. 
 
 37. David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 57 (2015). 
 38. See supra note 8 for citations. 
 39. See supra note 10 for citations. 
 40. SCALIA, supra note 12, at 138–40. 
 41. Barnett, supra note 5. 
 42. Strang, supra note 11. 
 43. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); 
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). 
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Vertical and horizontal stare decisis should be 
distinguished.44 Vertical stare decisis requires lower courts to give 
binding effect to the holdings of higher courts to which they are 
subordinate, whereas horizontal stare decisis requires a court to 
give its own prior decisions something that is less than binding 
effect but more than merely persuasive effect. 
Although I cannot marshal the evidence on this occasion, I 
believe that there are at least three distinct theories of stare decisis 
that are explicitly or implicitly operating in the courts in the 
United States. The first of these theories is what I will call the 
“ratio decidendi view.” It maintains that the holding of a case is 
the rule that is logically entailed by the reasoning that was 
necessary to reach the outcome on the basis of the legally salient 
facts and the arguments of the parties. The second theory I call 
the “legally salient facts account.” This view maintains that the 
holding of the case requires that the same outcome be reached if 
and only if all of the legally salient facts are identical. The third 
theory is the “predictive theory,” which is the view that the 
holding of a case is the best prediction of the rule that the court 
would use to decide future cases: this theory gives special weight 
to “we hold that” statements, because such statements are 
especially good evidence of the court’s likely future behavior.45 
These three theories are radically different from one another. 
The predictive theory allows for very broad holdings that reach 
far beyond the facts of the particular case. The legally salient facts 
account results in very narrow holdings, because in almost all 
cases there are numerous facts that are legally salient: broad rules 
only emerge from a series of decisions. The ratio decidendi view 
can result in either broad or narrow holdings, depending on the 
reasoning used to reach the outcome and its interaction with the 
facts and arguments of the parties. My impression is that the 
current state of the doctrine of stare decisis is radically disordered. 
Many judges cannot even articulate their own theory of stare 
decisis, adopting an eclectic approach that uses different theories 
on different occasions. Worse, some judges may use more than 
one theory on a single occasion. Sadly, many in the legal academy 
 
 44. See Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis, 
in PRECEDENT IN LAW 81–82 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987). 
 45. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Holdings, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (last 
modified July 30, 2017), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/10/legal_
theory_le_2.html. 
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are equally confused, reflecting decades of neglect of this 
important topic. 
D. THE EASIER PROBLEM OF VERTICAL PRECEDENT 
What should originalists say about vertical precedent? For 
example, what should a United States District Court judge do 
when the holding of a Supreme Court case requires an outcome 
that differs from the outcome required by the original meaning? 
Although there is room for reasoned disagreement, the 
conventional wisdom is that this is an easy case: the lower court is 
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Even if one 
believes that the Supreme Court itself should always follow the 
original meaning, there are very strong arguments that lower 
courts should not strike out on their own. If every judge were 
authorized to impose their own view of the original meaning of 
the constitutional text, the rule of law values of predictability, 
certainty, stability, publicity, and uniformity would be 
undermined. Given the reality that different judges may have 
different views about original meaning, there is even potential for 
a kind of judicial anarchy that could lead to substantial disorder. 
From an originalist perspective, there is a further question, 
whether vertical stare decisis is consistent with the public meaning 
of the constitutional text: some remarks on this topic are provided 
below.46 
E. THE HARDER PROBLEM OF HORIZONTAL PRECEDENT 
What about the United States Supreme Court? Or a state 
court of last resort in cases arising under a state constitution? How 
should these courts deal with horizontal precedent when it 
conflicts with original meaning? This problem is only hard for 
those who accept originalism or adhere to a version of living 
constitutionalism that includes both original meaning and 
precedent as methods or modalities of constitutional 
interpretation and construction. For a common law 
constitutionalist, there is no problem at all: precedent or 
departures from precedent justified by common law methods 
always win. 
Why might originalists go with precedent rather than original 
meaning? There are several possibilities, including the following: 
 
 46. See infra Part III. 
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(1) the original meaning of the constitution itself requires 
adherence to precedent; (2) although original meaning should 
prevail over precedent as a matter of ideal theory, there are good 
and sufficient reasons to adhere to precedent as a matter of 
nonideal theory during a period of transition from living 
constitutionalism to originalism; (3) although original meaning is 
binding as a source of first order reasons, there are good and 
sufficient second-order reasons to utilize a system that 
incorporates the doctrine of stare decisis as the mechanism by 
which original meaning is determined. Part III of this Article will 
offer some observations about the first possibility—that original 
meaning requires adherence to precedent. The other three 
possibilities are explored in the remainder of this Part. 
F. PRECEDENT AND THE UNDERLYING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR 
ORIGINALISM 
Originalists differ with respect to the underlying justifications 
for originalism. To simplify, let us assume that there are two 
primary strands of justification: (1) the rule of law and (2) 
democratic legitimacy. What implications do these different 
justifications have for the role of precedent in an originalist 
jurisprudence? In the discussion that follows, I will argue that this 
role should be understood as transitional. In the discussion that 
follows, I will discuss two justifications for the Constraint 
Principle: the first focuses on the rule of law and the second is 
based on the idea of democratic legitimacy.47 Each justification for 
constraint has implications for the role of precedent in the 
transition to originalism. 
The full case for originalism on the basis of the rule of law is 
complex and multidimensional,48 but one version of the argument 
focuses on the rule of law values of predictability, certainty, 
stability, publicity, and uniformity. Consider the following 
thought experiment: 
Originalist Big Bang Thought Experiment: The appointment of 
nine originalist judges within a few years creates a system of 
constitutional adjudication in which the Supreme Court 
decides each and every constitutional issue solely on the basis 
 
 47. See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 4. 
 48. Id. (describing three distinct rule-of-law justifications for the Constraint 
Principle, including (1) an argument from the rule of law values, (2) an argument from 
judicial tyranny, and (3) an argument from politicization of the judiciary). 
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of the Court’s best current judgment about the original 
meaning of the constitutional text. This results in an originalist 
big bang. Over the course of a few terms, the Supreme Court 
(1) invalidates all independent regulatory agencies based on 
the original meaning of executive, legislative, and judicial 
power, (2) strikes down half the provisions of the United States 
Code as exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers, (3) 
prohibits plea bargaining and requires jury trials in all criminal 
cases, (4) eliminates substantive due process, and (5) restores 
the original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
As a result of the big bang, federal law as a whole becomes 
unpredictable, inconsistent, and uncertain.49 
In the hypothetical world of the thought experiment, an 
originalist big bang would be inconsistent with the rule of law 
justification for originalism. 
For this reason, even a Supreme Court with nine originalist 
Justices might adhere to precedent during a transitional period. 
Indeed, this idea of a gradual transition to originalism could be 
built into originalism itself: for example, I have articulated a 
version of the Constraint Principle that requires consistency with 
originalism “in due course” and not immediately.50 The length of 
the transition period would depend on the extensiveness of the 
changes required by originalism and judgments about the rapidity 
with which they could be effected without damage to the rule of 
law. And this might depend on reactions from the political system: 
for example, an initial decision suggesting the unconstitutionality 
of one independent regulatory agency might create political 
conditions that would enable a constitutional amendment that 
squared such agencies (with proper safeguards) with the rule of 
law. 
Likewise, the democratic legitimacy rationale for originalism 
might justify gradual implementation of the Constraint 
Principle.51 Some precedents might actually be consistent with 
 
 49. I am not taking the position that originalism would require all of the five 
outcomes described in text. This is a thought experiment, not an analysis of the original 
meaning of the constitutional text. 
 50. This is the position I take in Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 4 
(manuscript at 21) (stating the Constraint Principle with the following qualifications: “If 
[the requirements of constraint as consistency] are not satisfied, then constitutional 
practice should be brought into compliance with constraint over time, giving due regard to 
the effects of constitutional change on the rule of law.”). 
 51. In The Constraint Principle, I argue that there are three legitimacy-based 
justifications for constraint: (1) democratic legitimacy, (2) transparency, and (3) legitimate 
judicial role. See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 4.  
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democratic legitimacy: for example, nonoriginalist precedents in 
the voting rights area might be consistent with the underlying 
democratic legitimacy arguments for originalism. In other cases, 
clear and convincing evidence might indicate wide and deep 
support for precedents that are inconsistent with original 
meaning. In such cases, the value of democratic legitimacy might 
itself support a gradual transition to originalism, such that 
democratic processes could produce constitutional amendments 
that would bring the original meaning of the constitutional text 
into line with the results preferred by democratic consensus. 
Randy Kozel has a different account of the relationship 
between the underlying justifications for originalism and 
precedent. Kozel maintains that forms of originalism are 
differentiated by their underlying justifications. Thus, 
“consequentialist originalism” is distinct from “popular 
sovereignty” originalism. Kozel then argues that the normative 
justifications for originalism directly bear on the question whether 
precedent is consistent with originalism (pp. 65-66). This move 
confuses first-order and second-order reasons. In the 
constitutional context, a first-order reason is the reason given for 
resolution of a constitutional case or issue, whereas a second-
order reason determines which first-order reasons should be 
brought to bear. 
The whole point of originalism is to provide second-order 
reasons that make a certain kind of first-order reason mandatory. 
For PMO, the first-order reasons provided by the original public 
meaning of the constitutional text override other first-order 
reasons: this is the point of the Constraint Principle. Of course, 
the Constraint Principle must itself be justified in some way: the 
justifications for constraint are second-order reasons. For 
example, I have argued that the Constraint Principle is justified 
by two clusters of arguments, one based on the rule of law and the 
other grounded in the idea of democratic legitimacy.52 
Kozel’s argument implicitly assumes that the second-order 
reasons that justify a given form of originalism can then be applied 
directly to questions of constitutional interpretation. In other 
words, Kozel assumes that the second-order reasons that justify 
originalism provide first-order reasons to ignore originalism itself. 
This is a mistake, even if some originalists have made it: the whole 
 
 52. See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 4. 
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point of a second-order reason is to specify what first-order 
reasons are required or permitted. For originalists, the idea that 
originalism is a method for “[d]eterming how costly it would be to 
uphold a precedent” shows a fundamental misunderstanding of 
originalism itself. Violations of the Constraint Principle are not a 
cost to be weighed in an all-things-considered judgment about 
what is the right thing to do: the balancing approach to 
constitutional practice is a form of nonoriginalist living 
constitutionalism. 
Many of Kozel’s arguments work, if they are limited to a 
period of transition from living constitutionalism to full 
implementation of originalism. But the same underlying 
justifications that support a transitional period would have 
different implications in the long run. The rule of law and 
democratic legitimacy support the Constraint Principle, which 
requires consistency with the constitutional text. Once the 
transition to originalism is complete, the use of precedent ought 
to be brought into line with the original meaning of the 
constitutional text. 
G. PRECEDENT AND NONIDEAL THEORY 
When originalism is presented as an ideal theory,53 many 
thorny problems are “swept under the rug.” We simply assume a 
world in which originalism has already been adopted and in which 
all of the relevant constitutional actors both affirm originalism as 
the correct theory and are motivated to conform their actions to 
the Constraint Principle. In the actual world, originalism has not 
been adopted, many constitutional actors reject originalism, and 
even actors who affirm originalism in principle may not be 
motivated to comply with the Constraint Principle in some 
circumstances. Originalism is hotly debated, and it seems likely 
that many executive officials, members of Congress, judges, and 
Justices reject originalism. 
Political and judicial originalism aim at the realization of 
originalism in both the long run and the short term. This means 
that many questions of tactics and strategy are on the table, 
especially in the early days of a transition to originalism. 
Originalist judges on a collegial court may need to write 
 
 53. For explication of the distinction between ideal and nonideal theories, see 
Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307 (2008). 
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nonoriginalist opinions as part of the give and take required to get 
judicial business done—and even to limit the number of occasions 
upon which they write extensive originalist concurrences and 
dissents. An originalist judge might make the tactical decision that 
a precedent-based decision that moves the law towards original 
meaning is better than a dissent or concurrence accompanying a 
decision that moves the law in the opposite direction. 
Originalist senators might vote to confirm nonoriginalist 
judges as a matter of political compromise or accommodation to 
the fact that the judiciary must continue to function. Under actual 
political conditions, judges who are committed to precedent may 
be preferable to those who embrace judicial legislation unbound 
by law of any sort. For all these reasons and more, nonoriginalist 
precedent might be endorsed by political and judicial originalism 
(the practical versions of originalism for officials and judges)—
not as the first best option, but as an originalist second best.54 
H. PRECEDENT AND DISAGREEMENT ABOUT ORIGINAL 
MEANING 
In originalist heaven, there would be universal agreement 
about the original meaning of the constitutional text and every 
constitutional actor would comply with that meaning: precedent 
would have no role in constitutional practice. Every decision 
would be correct and adherence to precedent would be 
superfluous. But in the actual world, things are more complex. In 
the actual world, the original meaning of many constitutional 
provisions is uncertain. In the actual world, there is likely to be 
disagreement about original meaning. Some of that disagreement 
may result from good faith differences about the weighing of the 
evidence, but some may result from motivated reasoning or bad-
faith results-oriented manipulation of the evidence. Partially ideal 
theory should take these complications into account. 
Given a world in which there is disagreement about original 
meaning, there are good reasons to create mechanisms of 
institutional settlement. The doctrine of stare decisis is such a 
mechanism. Vertical stare decisis centralizes institutional 
authority to determine original meaning in the Supreme Court. 
This centralization of authority would likely be superior to a 
 
 54. The idea of an originalist second-best is explored in Solum, Constitutional 
Possibilities, supra note 53. 
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decentralized regime for reasons that have already been 
discussed. Decentralized authority over the law is unworkable, 
given substantial disagreement about legal content. 
Horizontal stare decisis can play a similar role. The Justices 
of the Supreme Court may disagree about original meaning in 
good faith. Given the uncertainty about original meaning, 
horizontal stare decisis would facilitate the stability of law: 
mistakes about original meaning could be corrected, but 
deference to prior decisions would facilitate an orderly process. 
Without some such mechanism, the Court might change its mind 
about the correct interpretation of some constitutional provisions 
on a regular basis—as new evidence came to light or new 
arguments were made about the meaning of the evidence. 
Horizontal stare decisis on questions of interpretation might 
operate to preserve the status quo until clear and convincing 
evidence had produced a substantial consensus that there had 
been an error. 
Notice that this justification for precedent only operates 
when the prior decision involved a good faith attempt to 
determine the original meaning of the constitutional text. 
Decisions that ignored original meaning or gave decisive weight 
to policy judgments about desirable outcomes would not be 
entitled to deference on this ground. Originalist precedents would 
be entitled to deference, but nonoriginalist precedents would only 
be followed for other reasons—such as those identified above.55 
I. PRECEDENT AND THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
The discussion so far has been about the relationship 
between precedent and interpretation, but from the perspective 
of PMO, there is a distinct question about the role of precedent in 
the construction zone. By definition, a case is in the construction 
zone if and only if the original meaning of the constitutional text 
is underdeterminate with respect to an outcome-affecting issue. 
Consider the simplest case, in which the text is vague or open-
textured. Let us assume that the preferred method of 
constitutional construction requires the Court to precisify: for 
example, the Court needs to devise a rule to resolve the 
borderline cases between executive and legislative power. Once 
the Court has chosen a rule, the doctrine of horizontal stare 
 
 55. See supra Parts II.F, II.G. 
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decisis could be applied without violating the Constraint 
Principle. Similar points could be made about what are called 
“implementing rules”—norms of constitutional law that 
implement original meaning. 
For example, if the exclusionary rule were consistent with 
original meaning (a big “if”) and if the exclusionary rule faithfully 
implemented the Fourth Amendment (another big “if”), then the 
doctrine of horizontal stare decisis would suggest that the cases 
establishing the rule should not be overturned without especially 
good reasons. Moreover, the rule of law might favor giving 
precedent in the construction zone “gravitational force” in order 
to produce constitutional norms that are coherent, consistent, and 
stable. Resolving issues about the precise role of precedent will be 
determined by a theory of constitutional construction, a topic that 
is addressed below.56 
III. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ABOUT A PUBLIC 
MEANING ORIGINALIST INQUIRY INTO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PRECEDENT 
From an originalist perspective, there is a further question: is 
stare decisis consistent with original meaning? The discussion that 
follows looks at this question from the perspective of PMO. Does 
the original public meaning of the constitutional text permit, 
forbid, or require a doctrine of stare decisis to be applied to 
questions of constitutional interpretation and construction?  I 
provide a set of ideas about how a PMO inquiry should proceed 
but do not attempt to examine the evidence and reach 
conclusions. 
The first step in the quest for original public meaning is an 
inquiry into the semantic meaning of the words and phrases. This 
requires identification of the relevant parts of the constitutional 
text and structure. The constitutional text makes no explicit 
reference to precedent or stare decisis. Nonetheless, there are 
clauses that might have implications for the constitutional status 
of precedent. The key phrases include “judicial power,” “one 
Supreme Court,” “inferior courts,” and “the Supreme Law of the 
Land.” Structurally, the division of authority between the 
supreme and the inferior courts and separation of powers 
between the “Judicial,” “Executive,” and “Legislative” branches 
 
 56. See infra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
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may be relevant as well. The aim of PMO is to recover the 
communicative comments of the relevant clauses, as well as any 
additional content communicated by the constitutional structure. 
Practices, expectations, and goals may be relevant to this inquiry 
as evidence, but PMO does not take the position that these 
practices, expectations, and goals are binding at the interpretation 
stage.57 
The best approach to recovering the original semantic 
meaning of the words and phrases would utilize corpus linguistics, 
but as of this writing the most useful data set, COFEA (the 
Corpus of Founding Era American English) is still in beta 
testing.58 Corpus analysis provides primary evidence of patterns 
of usage, which are constitutive of semantic meaning. Period 
dictionaries provide secondary evidence, and they may be 
especially helpful in identifying the range of possible senses 
(semantic meanings) of the semantic units that comprise the 
constitutional text. Similar analysis of syntax, including grammar 
and punctuation, would be required as well. Immersion in the 
period by study of a wide variety of texts provides a second route 
to the recovery of the relevant semantics and syntax. 
The second step involves attention to context, including the 
context provided by the whole constitutional text, the 
constitutional record, relevant historical events (e.g., the 
Revolutionary War and experience under the Articles of 
Confederation), and other salient facts. From the perspective of 
PMO, the relevant context is the publicly accessible context—
those features of the whole context that would have been 
accessible to the “public”—understood as citizens who were 
competent speakers of American English at the relevant time. 
The investigation of context requires study of the constitutional 
record and the history of the period. Once again, immersion 
provides a second route for recovery of the context that would 
have been accessible to the public. 
The goal of such inquiry is the recovery of the full 
communicative content of the constitutional text: what did the 
 
 57. The role of practices, expectations, and goals at the construction stage is a 
different matter. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: 
A Unified Theory of Originalism, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049056. 
 58. BYU Law 2018 Law & Corpus Linguistics Conference, Law & Corpus Linguistics 
Project, BYU L., http://lawcorpus.byu.edu/2018-conference/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). 
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Constitution communicate to the public? No answers to this 
question are provided here, but we can note some important 
questions that should be asked: 
• What was the semantic content of the phrase “judicial 
power”? Was judicial power understood to encompass 
some version of the doctrine of stare decisis? Was the 
phrase “judicial power” underdeterminate with respect to 
precedent, allowing but not requiring the exercise of some 
range of binding judicial precedent? 
• What was the meaning of “one Supreme Court” as 
contrasted with “inferior courts”? Did the characterization 
of the highest Court as “Supreme” (and other courts as 
“inferior”) entail a power of vertical stare decisis, or was 
this power limited to what we now call “law of the case” 
and “claim preclusion” (res judicata)? Again, was this 
meaning thick (specifying the powers that accompany a 
“supreme” court), or thin (creating a construction zone)? 
• What are the implications of the Supremacy Clause for 
precedent? Does the Supremacy Clause implicitly place the 
Constitution at the top of the hierarchy of law? Does the 
omission of precedent from the list of supreme law entail 
that judicial precedent cannot override the constitutional 
text? 
These questions provide a sense of the inquiry that will be 
required at the interpretation stage. It is possible that 
interpretation will resolve the constitutional status of vertical and 
horizontal stare decisis. But there is also the possibility that the 
constitutional status of precedent is located in the construction 
zone. For example, we might conclude that the doctrine of vertical 
stare decisis is required by the notion of a “Supreme Court” but 
that the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis is underdetermined. 
What then? 
The current state of play is that there is continued inquiry, 
discussion, and debate on the question as to what theory of 
constitutional construction should be incorporated into PMO. 
Two things seem clear: (1) constitutional construction must 
respect the Constraint Principle (consistency with the public 
meaning of the constitutional text in due course) and (2) the 
general approach to cases and issues in the construction zone must 
be consistent with the underlying normative justifications for 
7 - SOLUM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/6/18 10:57 AM 
470 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:451 
 
originalism (e.g., the rule of law and democratic legitimacy). 
Among the possible approaches are: (1) a constitutional functions 
approach that emphasizes the original purposes of constitutional 
provisions;59 (2) a default rules approach that would apply rules of 
deference where the constitution is not clear;60 and (3) an original 
methods approach that would look to original methods for 
resolving cases of constitutional underdeterminacy.61 
These three approaches (and others) might diverge on 
important issues. For example, a default rules approach might 
give the Supreme Court discretion in the absence of a statute that 
codifies the doctrine of judicial precedent. The constitutional 
functions approach might suggest that the doctrine of stare decisis 
must be subordinate to the central function of the constitutional 
text (to govern those who govern us) and hence that 
nonoriginalist precedents and precedents that undermine the 
original functions of particular constitutional provisions are not 
entitled to any substantial weight in the Supreme Court. The 
original methods approach would require a careful investigation 
of the methods of constitutional construction in the 1780s; it might 
be that the doctrines of horizontal and vertical stare decisis as they 
existed at that time would be considered original methods 
themselves. 
CONCLUSION: ORIGINALISM AND PRECEDENT, 
AGAIN! 
The central aim of this article is to issue a call to action, 
urging constitutional scholars to return to the problem of 
precedent for originalism in a rigorous way that takes into account 
recent developments in constitutional theory. The focus here has 
been on PMO, but similar points could be made from the 
perspectives of intentionalism, original methods originalism, and 
original law originalism. Despite all the spilled ink, much work 
remains to be done. 
 
 59. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 57. 
 60. For elaboration, see Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 4, at 511–23. 
For Lawson, see Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1233–34 
(2012). For Paulsen, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for 
Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009). Lawson and Paulsen enunciate 
different sets of default rules and they believe the default rules can be gleaned from 
constitutional interpretation—and hence that they eliminate constitutional 
underdeterminacy: these issues are discussed in my Constitutional Construction. 
 61. McGinnis & Rappaport, The Good Constitution, supra note 9. 
